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ABSTRACT
MEASURING EMPLOYEE PERCEPTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL TOLERANCE
FOR FAILURE
by Perla Yael Slutzky
The empirical concept of Organizational Tolerance for Organizational Failure was
examined. First, a clear definition of the concept was established and, second, the
concept’s dimensionality was explored. Based on data collected from 140 participants,
four main scale components were identified: Organizational Values and Beliefs,
Organizational and Supervisor Support and Motivation, Compensation and Reward
Systems, and Recognition. Even though the final scale developed represented a good
research base, further development is needed to improve some of the subscale’s internal
consistencies.
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Introduction
During recent decades, the concept of innovation in general and organizational
innovation in particular has received a great deal of attention. From newspapers to
professional magazines, books, digital media, and academic journals, innovation is seen
as having a key role for survival and competitive advantages in today’s changing world.
As organizations try to keep up with rapid market dynamics, new technologies, and
customers’ changing needs, their abilities to adapt to changes and to innovate have gained
importance in the business agenda. This increasing significance was illustrated by
Crossan and Apayadin (2010), who showed that from the early 1980s to 2008, the
number of academic publications on innovation in areas such as management, business,
and finance grew more than 300%.
As a matter of fact, the concept of innovation is not new. In 1934, Schumpeter
was the first to coin the concept of innovation as novel ideas taking place at a firm level.
Throughout the years, different definitions have been suggested; however, none of them
have become dominant. The main reason was that each of the definitions called attention
to different aspects of innovation. To close this gap, two recent extensive literature
reviews proposed multidisciplinary definitions for organizational innovation. Baregheh,
Rowley, and Sambrook (2009) defined it as a multi-stage transformation process of new
ideas into products, services, and procedures in an organizational setting. Advancement,
competition, and differentiation from competitors in the market are possible due to the
process of innovation. More recently, Crossan and Apayadin (2010) extended the
definition to
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“production or adoption, assimilation, and exploitation of a value-added novelty in
economic and social spheres; renewal and enlargement of products, services, and
markets; development of new methods of production; and establishment of new
management systems. It is both a process and an outcome” (p.1155).
Considering the growing competition due to open markets, globalization, and new
technologies, more than ever organizations need to be innovative in order to survive.
Because changes are taking place at a much faster pace than in the past, organizations
find themselves needing to develop new capabilities to approach and overcome constant
challenges. These capabilities, which are required at all hierarchical levels, include
greater innovative competence (Kriegesmann, Kley, & Schwering, 2005). Therefore,
similar to the argument proposed by Damanpour (1991), innovation might be considered
as a mechanism to cope with internal and external organizational changes. Hence, it is
important for organizations to actively foster innovation if they hope to get through
continuously changing environments in a successful way.
Given the breadth of definitions of organizational innovation, previous research
has attempted to categorize different forms of innovation to make the term easier to
manage. One main distinction made by researchers is between incremental and radical
innovation. Incremental innovation includes small technological changes, improvements,
and line extensions of existing products. It requires little deviation from the current
product-market experiences of the firm (Damanpour, 1997). In contrast, radical
innovation involves core changes in technology (Atuahene-Gima, 2005), and represents a
deviation from current organizational practices (Damanpour, 1997).

2

For the purpose of this paper, when discussing innovation, the author of the
present study will refer to radical innovation. Even though incremental innovation is
considered an innovation, generally speaking, when people are asked to think about
innovation, or innovative products, they tend to contemplate the radical type of
innovation over the incremental one.
Organizational Failure
Radical organizational innovation may not be attained without experiencing
failures. Organizational failure is defined as the discrepancy between the expected or
desired results and the actual ones (Cannon & Edmonson, 2005). This definition covers
unwanted mistakes and unavoidable results of risk taking and exploration. Cannon and
Edmonson (2005) argued that organizational failure is usually perceived as a negative
outcome that organizations should seek to avoid. Failure is generally related to money
wasting, destroyed reputation and confidence, angry clients, and sometimes a company’s
death (McGrath, 2011).
In the 2000’s, however, a new line of management literature has emerged with a
much more positive perspective on organizational failure (Cannon et al., 2005; Farson &
Keyes, 2002b; McGrath, 2011; Sitkin, 1992; Sutton, 2004). This new approach assumes
that failure is a necessary requirement for organizational success and change. Through
failure, organizations can obtain information that they would not have otherwise. In the
business world, some leaders seem to agree with this perspective. For instance,
Kettering, a former vice president for General Motors, claimed that every educated
person needs to understand that “it’s not a disgrace to fail, and you must analyze each
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failure to find its cause... You must learn to fail intelligently. Failing is one of the
greatest arts in the world. One fails forward, towards success” (Farson & Keys, 2002a,
p.68). Furthermore, these authors hold that management should be straightforwardly
ready to accept risk in order to achieve innovation. Management needs to understand that
failure is a natural part of the process, and as such, organizations should display tolerance
for failure. Similarly, Dell’s CEO, Michael Dell, expressed that failing is the basis for
innovativeness advantage (Cottrill, 2010).
Another main premise of this new approach is that failure is inevitable in
uncertain environments. Nonetheless, if managed well, failure can represent a very
functional tool at hand for innovation and growth (McGarth, 2011). Supporters of this
view also believe that crises are the only factors that cause movement and change within
organizations. Similar to organisms that get through adversity and become a better fit to
their environments, struggling organizations that develop coping mechanisms to
overcome crises become more flexible and develop a sense of cohesiveness (Farson et al.,
2002b).
Advocates to this new perspective have proposed categories for different failure
types that exist in organizational contexts; this is a critical aspect which eases the task of
distinguishing and identifying between acceptable/desired and unacceptable/undesirable
failures. For instance, Amabile and Kahire (2008) classified failures into three main
categories: systems breakdowns, process deviations, and unsuccessful trials. They
concluded that all of these types need to be examined and treated with care once they
occur. Also, Kriegsmann et al. (2005) provided classification for the possible sources of
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error taking place at organizations. Some errors include excessive caution that might
result in “paralysis through analysis” (i.e., not taking any action because of fear of
possible consequences), the lack of capability to respond, or the over-estimation of one’s
capabilities (i.e., taking risk without analyzing the odds of success and consequences).
Intelligent Failure
In addition to dissimilar sources, failures might also differ in the degree of
learning potential they possess. Sitkin (1992) was the first to define the concept of
“intelligent failure” as including mistakes that facilitate and foster organizational
learning. For a mistake to be included in this category, it must meet five key
characteristics: “(1) they result from thoughtfully planned actions that (2) have uncertain
outcomes and (3) are of modest scale, (4) are executed and responded to with alacrity,
and (5) take place in domains that are familiar enough to permit effective learning.”
(Sitkin, 1992, p. 243)
In a similar way, Williams (1998) defined “smart mistakes” as those mistakes that
result in non-favorable consequences for the organization, but have been taken under
meticulous consideration for the objective of enlarging the organization’s decision set.
Kriegsmann et al. (2005) called the failure of innovative initiatives that were conducted
with calculated risk, “creative and heroic errors.” The authors believed that in situations
confronting failure, the person responsible for the “creative error” should not be ridiculed
but rather stimulated to undertake further, thoughtful risks in a spirit of optimism. These
creative errors had a potential learning benefit not only at an individual level, but at the
organizational level as well. According to Amabile et al., (2008), unsuccessful trials are
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the only kind of failure that might be recognized as “intelligent” and result in positive
organizational learning. Therefore, intelligent failures will be considered as the only type
of failure that will be acceptable within organizations since they promote organizational
learning necessary for radical innovation.
Organizational Learning
Reviewing the literature on organizational innovation suggests that innovative
companies share some organizational characteristics. One of the essential qualities
necessary to foster innovation within organizations is organizational learning. Senge
(2006) defined learning organizations as “organizations where people continually expand
their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of
thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are
continually learning about how to learn together.” (p.4) The author also suggested that to
become a successful venture, organizations would have to be able to recognize people’s
learning capabilities and commitment from all organizational levels.
Garvin, Edmonson, and Gino (2008) proposed that employees in a learning
organization contribute to developing tolerance, encouraging honest dialogue, and
thinking collectively in a systematic way. As a result, this kind of organization will be
more flexible and adaptable to unpredictable changes than its competitors. Not
surprisingly, an increasing number of organizations are redefining their mission
statements to tag themselves as learning organizations in order to prove themselves
superior to others in the competition for innovation (Kriegesmann et al., 2005).
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Previous research has found a positive relationship between organizational
learning and innovation. Pak (2004) claimed that a learning organization was the natural
foundation from which effective innovation surfaced. He believed that it was more
important and useful to focus on the ability of an organization to learn to innovate and
discover innovative ways to do so than to focus on an organization that would innovate.
Similarly, in a meta-analysis conducted by Damanpour (1991), the author suggested that
learning environments created by leaders supported the occurrence of learning by
exploration, which eventually resulted in an innovativeness advantage for organizations.
Exploitation and Exploration
Exploitation and exploration are two extreme ends of the organizational learning
spectrum (Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010). At the same time, both are important steps
in the innovation process. These two competences are necessary for an organization’s
prosperity and survival. However, they compete against each other for an organization’s
scarce resources.
One end of the organizational learning spectrum is exploitation. This was first
described by March (1991), who used words such as improvement, efficiency,
implementation, and execution. In later work, Levinthal and March (1993) limited the
extent of the first definition to the knowledge domain. They claimed that exploitation
demands the utilization and expansion of the already known. Atuahene-Gima (2005)
found that exploitation was only related to incremental innovation performance. In
addition, Danneels (2002) asserted that exploitation might hinder radical innovations due
to its focus on increasing homogeneity, effectiveness, and productivity upgrades in
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existing products. Contrary to exploration, exploitation focuses on short-term
organizational performance by increasing reliability and effectiveness and decreasing the
chances of mistakes and failures.
On the other end of the organizational learning spectrum is exploration, which
aims for long-term organizational performance. It involves activities such as
experimenting, searching, and discovering that the main goal is the pursuit of new
knowledge (March, 1991). Exploration has a central and revealing role in the innovation
process. When undertaking exploration, the main objective is to identify developing
markets and technologies to generate radical, rather than incremental, innovations that
will offer added value to the organization’s customers (Lavie et al., 2010; March, 1991).
Because of its intrinsic nature, exploration usually changes the organization’s current
knowledge base and competencies (Lavie et al., 2010). In addition, Sutton (2004)
believed that breakthroughs or radical innovation are only possible through exploration.
Because the central aim of exploration is search and experimentation, failure is an
inherent element of this organizational learning approach. As Farson and Keys (2002b)
pointed out, failures are the proof of exploration. The more people engage in
experimentation, the more mistakes they are expected to make. Therefore, the authors
concluded that an increased level of errors in organizations might represent a
manifestation of an innovative environment. Likewise, Sutton (2004) claimed that what
was generally called errors, outliers, or mutations in organizations were the “lifeblood of
innovation.” When innovation is the goal, people need to continuously develop new
ideas that, like mutations in natural environments, often fail to sustain and outspread.
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One main consequence of engaging in organizational exploration and overcoming
increased levels of failures is that organizations become more resilient and flexible to
uncertain environments and markets (Sitkin, 1992). Kriegsman et al. (2005) explained
that radical innovation would not materialize in organizations characterized by risk and
mistake aversion. Reluctance towards errors will result in the avoidance of
experimentation; consequently, the organizational learning processes needed to pursue
new knowledge will not take place. According to Levinthal and March (1993), a
psychological safety net needs to be offered by organizations for explorative failures.
Therefore, companies that are not afraid of uncertain environments and “chaos” will be in
the best position to achieve radical innovation (Keyes et al., 2002b).
Intelligent Failure as an Outcome of Exploration
Intelligent failure is a major aspect of undertaking exploration for innovation
purposes, but it is sometimes under-valued. First, intelligent failures should be more
highly valued because they provide information to people on how to enhance their
decision making. Although they do not indicate what decisions would have been correct;
they improve the organization’s decision making process in general (Williams, 1998).
Second, because intelligent failures are often of a modest scale, small failures can act as
“early warning signs” that help avoid bigger failures (Sitkin, 1992). Cannon et al. (2005)
explained that organizations might overlook small daily failures because at the time they
appear to be trivial mistakes or isolated irregularities. As a consequence, organizations
do not take advantage of the opportunities that smart failures provide. The authors advise
organizations to actively develop intelligent processes to learn from small failures.
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This thesis will focus on radical innovation. Because exploration seems to be the
only approach related to this kind of innovation, the author will focus on exploration
rather than exploitation. In order for exploration to be successfully implemented,
organizations need to accept and embrace the occurrence of planned and small errors;
therefore, they need to display organizational tolerance for intelligent failure. Hence,
tolerance for intelligent failure will play an important mediating role between exploration
and innovation.
Organizational Tolerance for Intelligent Failure
Organizational tolerance for intelligent failure is defined as organizational
practices and characteristics that demonstrate the willingness to accept, promote, and
enhance the occurrence of exploration within an organization. Some of these practices
and characteristics might be embodied in the organization’s compensation and reward
systems and in their organizational and management support activities.
Organizational tolerance for intelligent failure is critical in today’s competitive
markets because of its impact on the innovative capability of organizations.
Kriegesmann et al. (2005) argued that organizations whose culture displayed failure
intolerance would develop innovative incompetence because creative and fearless
behaviors would be avoided. Failure has innovative potential when understood as a
learning process that provides information that otherwise would not be available. As
McGrath (2011) explained, managers understand the need to reduce the fear of failure,
engage in experiments constantly to fail early and often, and learn as much as possible in
the process. Moreover, Farson et al. (2002b) pointed out that what might be considered
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failures or mistakes gave birth to famous and successful products such as Nylon, Teflon,
microwave ovens, Gore-Tex, and 3M Post-It Notes.
Another important reason why organizational tolerance for failure is required is
related to the entrance of a new generation of workers to the labor market (Farson &
Keyes, 2002b). These new workers are more challenge and risk-seeking than their
predecessors. They tend to be more responsive to less stable situations and more
stimulated by uncertainty. These younger employees believe that in achieving successful
and innovative results, failure is inevitable; thus, people should not only tolerate it, but
encourage it to happen. For this reason, organizations that do not tolerate the occurrence
of failures are likely to risk losing their best and most innovative employees. Therefore,
organizations should adopt characteristics and practices that not only tolerate but actually
promote organizational exploration. Based on the existing literature, five main practices
and characteristics were identified: Compensation and Reward Systems, Organizational
Stories, Risk Taking, Psychological Safety, Supervisor Support. These aspects will be
discussed in the next section.
Organizational Practices and Characteristics Promoting Exploration
Compensation and Reward Systems. Compensation and reward systems are
commonly tied to employee performance. To promote exploration in organizations, the
main obstacle seems to be the development of a system that accounts for opposite forces
inherent in the innovation process: exploration and exploitation (McGregor, 2006). For
instance, IBM uses two different frames of time to evaluate its engineers: a one-year
frame to set bonuses and a three-year frame to determine statuses and salaries. The idea
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behind this system is to counterbalance possible setbacks that might occur in a certain
year due to the innovation process. In the same line of thinking, Ederer and Manso (2010)
found that pay-for-performance for tasks that involve innovation through exploration had
a detrimental result on employees’ performance. They concluded that employees under a
pay program that tolerates failure in early stages of the exploration activity and rewards
long-term success tend to explore more and, as a result, are more likely to discover
superior strategies than individuals receiving pay-for-performance incentives.
Organizational and Managerial Support.
Organizational Stories. Buckler and Zien (1996) interviewed several companies
around the world recognized for their maturity and innovation (e.g., Apple Computers,
Polaroid Corporation, 3M, HP). The researchers found that a common theme among
these organizations was that their innovation processes could be characterized by stories
of success, failure, and failure turned into success. The stories varied in content;
however, a common attribute for all of them was that every tale described innovation
qualities and behaviors of real people, many of whom their employees had never even
met. The authors believed that stories represent the organization’s most important beliefs
and values, and these representations are the medium for fast organizational learning and
content retention needed for innovation purposes.
To illustrate and establish the power of organizational stories, Buckler and Zien
(1996) described how companies such as 3M had brought a consultant to help the
organization collect their innovation stories and coach senior scientists and managers
how to tell these stories. The researchers concluded that these stories helped to build a
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“collective identity” which motivated employees to engage, persevere, courage, and
believe in the innovation process.
Risk Taking. In order to explore new opportunities and ideas in organizations,
employees need to be encouraged to take calculated risks. One way to explore new ideas
in a calculated manner is by testing the ideas in early stages, before large investments are
made in certain projects; these early tests are known as small-scale prototypes or pilots
(McGrath, 2011). Pilots allow employees to introduce new product or service ideas to
potential users. In this way, organizations learn to fail fast and cheap, providing an
opportunity to walk away from failed projects in a solid and intelligent way. In other
words, pilots help identify the need to cancel projects before it is too late. When this
happens, a solid disengagement project process needs to be put in place to collect data
that will encourage organizational learning to avoid making the same mistakes later
again.Risk taking is fundamental for exploration to occur. Akio Morita threatened to
resign from his position at Sony if the company decided not to support him with his new
product ideas (Buckler et al., 1996). Sony took a chance on Morita’s ideas that were
opposed to both market information and the beliefs of the entire company. As a result the
company gained a critical competitive advantage with the Walkman market.
Psychological Safety. Another way to encourage explorative activities in the
organizational context is by establishing programs or events where intelligently failed
ideas are celebrated. Kriegesmann et al., (2005) explained how BMW implemented the
“Creative Error of the Month” initiative. This program openly called for employees to
make mistakes and allowed them to take calculated risks. These behavioral maxims were
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designed to create risk-friendly environments, while providing latitude for acceptable
mistakes during the exploration process required for radical innovation.
Another example of how to encourage exploration throughout organizations is
3M. Employees possess the freedom to break operating rules, try a new course of actions,
and challenge their superiors in the name of innovation. Their main premise is that as
business grows, employees are delegated more responsibilities and practice more
initiative. When undertaking new initiatives, mistakes might occur, and management
needs to be supportive and not be destructive since that kills initiative (Buckler et al.,
1996).
Supervisor Support. Employees are usually willing to take risks and explore new
things in organizations when they believe they are supported by their direct supervisor.
McGregor (2006) suggested that leaders should create an environment that is safe for
taking risks. As a first step, managers should distinguish between acceptable and
unacceptable mistakes. This will allow them to achieve two main things. First, it creates
a non-punitive work environment where productive mistakes occur. Second, it allows
managers to promote intelligent failure, making them the basis for learning (Keyes et al.,
2002a). To do so, managers need to be interested in their direct reports’ tasks. Failure
tolerant managers’ engagement is displayed through conversations with their employees
about current tasks that they are performing, and asking thoughtful questions to help them
examine and learn from mistakes. These managers seek to collaborate with employees
rather than control them. Lastly, to promote more exploration and convey a message that
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failure is tolerated, managers should openly admit their own failures and mistakes.
Previous Research
Although there is an extensive literature on the importance of intelligent failure
for innovation, only one article has attempted to operationalize the concept of tolerance
for failure and utilize it for empirical research. Danneels (2008) defined tolerance for
failure as one of the organizational antecedents of second-order competencies. A secondorder competency is defined as the ability of a firm to engage in exploration or, in other
words, to acquire new competencies. Tolerance for failure was defined by the author as
the organizational perception of failure as a learning opportunity. One of Danneels’
hypotheses was that the higher a firm’s tolerance for failure, the higher its marketing and
R&D explorative activities. In order to operationalize the concept of tolerance for
failure, the author developed an original scale: “It is understood that failure is a
necessary part of success,” “Management doesn’t understand that when you try
something new, you sometimes fail,” “Failure is accepted as an inevitable byproduct of
taking a lot of initiatives,” and “A mistake is seen as an opportunity to learn” were the
four items included in the scale. Research data were collected at two different points in
time (i.e., 2000 and 2004).
The author of the present study believes that the definition provided by Danneels
(2008) presents three main conceptual problems. First, tolerance for failure as the
organizational perception of failure as a learning opportunity is too broad in the sense that
it includes any kind of failure. In other words, his study did not differentiate between
different kinds of failure. Therefore, failures with no learning potential, such as systems
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breakdowns, process deviations, and paralysis through analysis, are being placed at the
same level as intelligent failure. Consequently, the research results might be misleading.
Second, defining tolerance for failure as an “organizational perception” makes the
frame of reference unclear for respondents. Participants were asked to respond based on
how their company operates, rather than how they would like it to operate. For an item
such as “A mistake is seen as an opportunity to learn,” it is not clear at what level of
management the respondent should answer. There might be situations where top and mid
management level behaviors differ regarding their displayed tolerance for failure.
A third conceptual concern is that the items fail to address the gap between the
organization’s explicit intentions (i.e., the organization’s mission statement) and its actual
behavior. That is, an organization might recognize itself as willing to tolerate failure, but
at the same time be afraid of engaging in exploration due to the chances of failing. It
might be very useful to understand whether consistency exists between explicit and
implicit organization behaviors.
From a methodological point of view, relatively few items comprise the scale.
This is a central concern because it makes it difficult to determine of the concept’s
dimensionality. However, it is important to note that the creation of a measurement scale
for tolerance for failure was not Danneels’ main objective. The author did not try to
establish any dimensions in his research. Another relevant issue resulting from a small
number of scale items is the reliability concern. The fewer number of items, the less
reliable the scale. Lastly, statistically Danneels (2008) failed to establish a relationship
between tolerance for failure and second-order competencies in his longitudinal research.
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He unexpectedly found a negative lagged effect of tolerance for failure on R&D
competencies. He attributed the lack of impact to the absence of accountability created
by a culture of organizational failure tolerance. Employees might abuse the idea that
failure is a learning opportunity and, as a consequence, this may lead them to take
unconscientious decisions, while feeling no responsible for their actions.
These results draw attention to one important aspect: the definition of tolerance
for failure is quite different from the one that will be used in the present study.
Undesirable types of failures, such as over-estimation of one’s capabilities (i.e., taking
risk without analyzing the odds of success and consequences), when tolerated by
organizations, might be responsible to create the feeling of laxness that Danneels (2008)
described. However, intelligent failure, will probably avoid the lax situation mentioned
previously because it consists of thoughtfully planned actions that builds a sense of
accountability.
Purpose of the Study
The present study will aim to close the gaps and concerns describe above. First, it
will provide a new and more explicit definition for the concept of tolerance for failure. In
addition, a categorization and acceptability for different kinds of failures will be offered
to readers to narrow down the new definition. Therefore, only acceptable or desirable
failures will be included in this research. Second, this study will extend the number of
items, making sure that the frame of reference remains clear for respondents.
The main purpose of this paper will be to develop a reliable assessment tool
intended to measure employee perceptions of organizational tolerance for intelligent
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failure. The present study will be of an exploratory nature and will seek to identify the
dimensions that constitute the concept. Once this instrument is developed, organizations
will be able to have a better understanding of how employee perceptions of an
organization’s tolerance for failure. This study will also allow organizations to
understand and research their need to introduce changes required to improve their
innovation capabilities accordingly.
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Method
Scale Development
The author set out to develop a scale to measure employee perceptions of
organizational tolerance for intelligent failure required for radical innovation. This scale
was based on several organizational practices and characteristics that were identified in
the literature as tolerating and promoting exploration throughout organizations:
compensation and rewards systems, organizational stories, risk taking, psychological
safety, and supervisor support.
Compensation and reward systems refer to monetary and non-monetary practices,
such as bonuses and promotions, put in practice throughout organizations to reward or
punish behaviors. Organizational stories are defined as stories, gathered from past and
present organizational experiences of success or failure, and are believed to impart
motivational lessons for current employees. Risk taking refers to organizational support
provided to employees to engage in activities, such as exploration, where results are
usually unpredictable. By psychological safety, the author alludes to the general sense of
support and motivation employees feel after an undesirable organizational outcome has
occurred. Supervisor support refers to understanding offered by direct supervisors to
their direct reports. Organizational stories, risk taking, psychological safety, and
supervisor support are grouped in this study under a general category called
“organizational and managerial support.”
In the first stage, the author included four items developed by Danneels (2008):
“It is understood that failure is a necessary part of success;” “Management doesn’t
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understand that when you try something new, you sometimes fail;” “Failure is accepted
as an inevitable byproduct of taking a lot of initiatives;” and “A mistake is seen as an
opportunity to learn.” In the second stage, because no additional scales had been
developed for tolerance for failure, the author wrote original items based on the review of
the literature. All items were examined to assure that each item expressed only one idea,
avoided the use of negatives, did not use jargon or expressions, and were at an adequate
reading level for respondents. The author also focused on including items written in both
positive and negative wording (Spector, 1990).
The original scale, consisting of 33 items, was sent to four reviewers for their
examination and feedback. These contributors were selected from various backgrounds
(i.e., English instructors, industrial and organizational psychologists, engineers) to ensure
clarity and accuracy, as well as relevance of the statements for employees in
organizations.
Most of the items were well accepted by the reviewers, with none of the items
being eliminated from the original scale. However, some reviewers agreed on the need to
reword or expand specific items for better definition. For example, the item “I believe
my company’s compensation practices reward pay-for-performance for tasks that involve
exploration” took for granted that all companies rewarded performance. As a result, a
new item was added in front of the above item: “My company rewards for performance.”
If the respondent’s answer was yes, then they were taken to the next item, “I believe my
company’s compensation practices reward pay-for-performance for tasks that involve
exploration.” In addition, to explore employees’ perceptions of compensation practices
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in greater detail, two new items were added: “I feel less motivated to get involved in
exploration if I know the results will affect my performance reward” and “I think my
company’s pay programs tolerate failure in early stages of the exploration activity and
reward long-term success.”
A total of 36 items were included in the final scale-eight items measured
compensation and reward practices, five items measured organizational stories, five items
measured risk taking, six items measured psychological safety, six items measured
supervisor support, and additional six items were included for non-categorized
organizational practices.
Items in the scale such as “I believe my company punishes people that fail” and “I
feel that the rewards programs offered by my company encourage people to explore their
ideas, regardless of eventual outcomes,” were intended to measure compensation and
rewards practices. Organizational stories was addressed with items such as “At my
company, stories of past failures are used to encourage employees to try new things.” In
addition, risk taking was measured by items like “I feel my organization wants me to
avoid taking even calculated risks,” and “My company understands that risk taking is a
necessary requirement for exploration.” Examples of psychological safety were “My
company accepts that failure is a necessary part of success” and “My company believes
in “fail early, fail fast, fail cheap.” For the measurement of supervisor support, items
such as “My manager supports me when I try different ways of doing things,” and “I feel
that my manager encourages me to take small and thoughtful risks” were asked.
Examples for the non-categorized items were “The company I work for publicly
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expresses a tolerance for failure,” and “When a project is cancelled at work, it is analyzed
to understand what went wrong in order to avoid making similar mistakes in the future.”
Response choices for each item were presented on a five-point Likert scale
measuring the participant’s degree of agreement with each statement. The responses
ranged from strongly disagree (5) to strongly agree (1) with a middle response of neither
agree nor disagree (3). This five alternative choice format was chosen to provide
participants a wide range of responses without creating any unnecessary stress by the
number of choices. Moreover, it was taken into consideration that because the concept of
organizational tolerance for failure was a new one, there might be aspects that employees
were not definitive about, and therefore the author decided to provide respondents with a
neutral response choice.
An additional five items asking for demographics and background information
were included in the survey. These variables were age, gender, employment status (i.e.
full-time employed, part-time employed, and unemployed), industry, and length of
employment.
Participants
Because this study was intended to develop a scale for employees’ perceptions on
organizational tolerance for failure, participation in the online survey was limited to
experienced professionals. Furthermore, self-employed professionals were not included
in the sample. Because self-employed professionals frequently work in several
organizations at the same time, they do not report directly to management or work under
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one organization’s philosophy, their perceptions might not be pertinent for the purpose of
this current study.
Although a total of 161 responses participated in the online survey, only 140
responses were utilized for analysis. Two main criteria were determined by the author to
eliminate responses: considerable amount of missing data per participant and eligibility.
In other words, data for those participants who failed to fill out at least 95% of their
questionnaire or had no professional experience were eliminated to ensure a better
analysis. As shown in Table 1, 55% of the participants were female, and 44.3% were
male. In addition, 45.7% were between 18 to 29 years old, 22.9% were between ages 30
and 39 years old, 18.6% ranged between 40 to 49 years old, 7.1% were 50 to 59 years
old, and 5% were 60 years old or more. From the total participants 61.4% were
employed full-time, 28.6% were employed part-time, and the additional 8.6% were
unemployed.
Procedure
An online survey was created and administered to participants to allow them to
respond at a time convenient for them. Participants were selected by availability (i.e., the
researcher’s personal and professional contacts). The survey was administered through
an online survey tool, and participants were contacted by email or personal messages on
professional networking sites, and professional online forums. The message contained a
brief explanation of the purpose of the study, the number of items, the estimated time to
complete the survey, and the eligibility parameters to participate in the survey. In
addition, it explained that the survey was completely confidential and anonymous.
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of Participants
Demographic Variable
Age
18-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60+

N

%

64
32
26
10
7

45.7
22.9
18.6
7.1
5.0

Gender
Male
Female

62
77

44.3
55.0

Employment Status
Full-Time
Part-Time

86
40

61.4
28.6

Industry
High-Tech
Services
Other
Education
Finance
Retail
Consulting
Bio-Tech
Media

37
23
20
19
18
13
12
3
2

26.4
16.4
14.3
13.6
12.9
9.3
8.6
2.1
1.4

Length of Employment
Less than a year
Between 1 to 2 years
Between 2 to 5 years
More than 5 years

29
35
47
29

20.7
25.0
33.6
20.7

Note. n = 140
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When participants clicked on a link to the survey, they landed on the agreement
for participation survey page, which provided them with the researcher’s contact
information, information on the institution in charge of the research, and anticipated risks
and benefits for participation. In addition, it was explained to participants that their
participation would be completely voluntary, and they had the right to withdraw at any
time. Participants were allowed to take the survey at a convenient time to them, and if
they failed to complete the survey at one time, they were allowed to later re-access the
survey. A reminder was sent to potential participants two weeks after the original
email/message.
In the second stage, in order to gather a larger sample of data, the author
administered the survey to business students at San José State University. Participants
were required to fill out an internal questionnaire with basic demographic information
such as gender, age, academic major, employment status, and most current position they
held. After the information was submitted, the link to the online survey was made visible
to the respondents. The survey was identical to the one created for non-students
participants discussed earlier.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
Even though 161 responses were collected in the present research, after reviewing
for missing data and eligibility, only 140 were analyzed. Each of the Employee
Perceptions of Organizational Tolerance for Failure items was examined using measures
of central tendency, variability, skewness, and kurtosis. All items had a response format
ranging from a minimum of 1 (strongly agree) to a maximum of 5 (strongly disagree),
with the exception of one item, “My company rewards for performance,” which had a
yes/no response format.
The descriptive statistics indicated that most items displayed a normal distribution
(Table 2). No major concerns on skewness and kurtosis were identified. Having said
that, participants strongly disagreed with the statement, “My company organizes events
that celebrate projects that did not succeed” (M = 4.16, SD = .96). This same item
showed a negative measure for skewness (-1.24) and 1.16 for kurtosis. Therefore, the
author was concerned that this item would be poorly correlated with other items or might
result in a less reliable analysis. Other items that called the author’s attention were “My
manager supports me when I try different ways of doing things,” “I believe my company
is willing to take some risks to create new innovative services or products,” and “I
believe stories about successes and failures are an important part of meetings and
company events.” In comparison with the remaining items, these three items displayed a
relatively skewed pattern (.95, .79, and .87, respectively). In the examination for kurtosis
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issues, the author found that most of the items showed a negative pattern. This pattern
indicated variability in participants’ responses, hence were not considered as a concern.
Table 2
Employee Perceptions of Organizational Tolerance for Failure Scale: Descriptive
Statistics (n=138-140)
Compensation and Reward Systems
I believe my company punishes people that fail (R)
I feel that the rewards programs offered by my company encourage people
to explore their ideas regardless of eventual outcomes
My company organizes events that celebrate projects that did not succeed
I know people in my organization who were promoted even though they
were involved in projects that failed
I believe my company’s compensation practices reward pay-forperformance for tasks that involve exploration
I feel less motivated to get involved in exploration if I know the results will
affect my performance reward (R)
I think my company’s pay programs tolerate failure in early stages of the
exploration activity and reward long-term success
Organizational Stories
At my company, stories of past failures are used to encourage employees to
try new things
My company considers failure to be unacceptable
Stories about past successes and failures in my organization encourage me
to try new things
I believe stories about successes and failures are an important part of
meetings and company events
I rarely hear stories of past failures in my company (R)
Risk Taking
I feel my organization wants me to avoid taking even calculated risks (R)
My company provides resources to develop pilot studies or prototypes of
new products or services
I believe my company is willing to take some risks to create new
innovative services or products
I think my company prefers to avoid taking risks (R)
My company understands that risk taking is a necessary requirement for
exploration
Psychological Safety
My company accepts that failure is a necessary part of success
My company accepts failure as an inevitable byproduct of taking initiatives
Mistakes are seen by my company as opportunities to learn
When failures take place in my company, they are not criticized, but
analyzed to avoid them in the future
My company believes in “fail early, fail fast, fail cheap”
I am encouraged at work to keep trying, even when something I try goes
wrong
Supervisor Support
Senior management doesn’t understand that when you try something new,
you sometimes fail (R)
My manager supports me when I try different ways of doing things
I feel that my manager encourages me to take small and thoughtful risks
My manager has an analytical approach when mistakes occur that helps me
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Mean

SD

Skewness

Kurtosis

2.77
3.11

1.10
1.13

.24
.40

-.87
-.99

4.16
2.69

.96
1.03

-1.24
.28

1.16
-.53

3.25

1.02

-.30

-.99

2.56

.96

.43

-.22

2.38

.90

.55

.59

139

3.25

1.11

-0.29

140
2.74

2.73
1.08

1.12
.23

0.37
-.90

2.14

1.03

.87

.43

3.17

1.06

-.08

-.99

2.71
2.70

1.07
1.08

.24
.59

-.80
-.42

2.33

.92

.80

.41

3.30
2.63

1.21
1.03

-.23
.40

-1.07
-.78

2.76
2.89
2.55
2.84

1.08
1.01
1.02
1.06

.12
.22
.39
.15

-.84
-.80
-.56
-.83

3.05
2.40

1.07
1.10

-.10
.53

-.65
-.54

2.73

1.12

.37

-.72

2.25
2.44
2.62

1.00
.98
1.12

.95
.53
.52

.56
-.30
-.66

Employee Perceptions of Organizational Tolerance for Failure Scale: Descriptive
Statistics (n=138-140)
understand why they happened
I feel criticized and evaluated if I explore new ideas and they do not work
(R)
My manager has shared with me some of his/her own work mistakes
Others
At work, I am allotted time to work on projects of my own interest
The company I work for publicly expresses a tolerance for failure
The company I work for values the need for exploration
When a project is not going as expected, there is a clear plan on how to end
it before more resources are wasted
When a project is cancelled at work, it is analyzed to understand what went
wrong in order to avoid making similar mistakes in the future
My company allots special budgets to explore new projects/products
Note. (R) Reversed Word Items

Mean

SD

Skewness

Kurtosis

3.02

1.14

.16

-1.16

2.63

1.21

.55

-.80

2.82
3.31
2.48
3.03

1.23
1.03
1.05
1.13

.16
-.17
.53
-.08

-.98
-.60
-.40
-.58

2.51

1.20

.43

-.99

2.93

1.12

.26

-.72

Pearson Correlations
Pearson correlations were computed for all the items included in each of the six
aspects of organizational tolerance for failure. Regarding Compensation and Rewards
Systems correlations, the items did not show a consistent pattern (Table 3). In other
words, high and low correlations were found among the scale items, which do not
indicate any specific problematic items.
The items “I feel less motivated to get involved in exploration if I know the
results will affect my performance reward,” and “I think my company’s pay programs
tolerate failure in early stages of the exploration activity and reward long-term success”
had almost no relationship to other items. The item “I think my company’s pay programs
tolerate failure in early stages of the exploration activity and reward long-term success”
was found only slightly related to “I know people in my organization who were promoted
even though they were involved in projects that failed” (r = .18, p < .05). In addition, “I
feel less motivated to get involved in exploration if I know the results will affect my
performance reward” was somewhat correlated to “I feel that the rewards programs
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offered by my company encourage people to explore their ideas regardless of eventual
outcomes.” (r =.20, p < .05)
Table 3
Pearson Correlation: Compensation and Rewards Systems (n = 138)
1. I believe my company punishes people that fail
2. I feel that the rewards programs offered by my
company encourage people to explore their ideas
regardless of eventual outcomes
3. My company organizes events that celebrate
projects that did not succeed
4. I know people in my organization who were
promoted even though they were involved in projects
that failed
5. I feel less motivated to get involved in exploration
if I know the results will affect my performance
reward
6. I think my company’s pay programs tolerate failure
in early stages of the exploration activity and reward
long-term success
7. I believe my company’s compensation practices
reward pay-for-performance for tasks that involve
exploration

1
-

2

3

4

5

6

.31**

-

.20*

.25**

-

.37**

.14

.19*

-

.10

.20*

.10

.11

-

.15

.16

.06

.18*

-.06

-

-.05

-.18*

-.25**

-.04

.15

-.49**

7

-

*. p < .05, two-tailed. **. p < .01, two-tailed.

For Organizational Stories (Table 4), the item “Stories about past successes and
failures in my organization encourage me to try new things” showed high correlations to
all of the other items with the exception of “I rarely hear stories of past failures in my
company,” which the correlation was much weaker (r = .18, p < .05). Additional items
revealed different correlation strengths that similarly to the compensation and rewards
systems, showed no clear pattern.
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Table 4
Pearson Correlation: Organizational Stories (n=139)
1
1. At my company, stories of past failures are used to encourage employees to try
new things
2. My company considers failure to be unacceptable
3. Stories about past successes and failures in my organization encourage me to try
new things
4. I believe stories about successes and failures are an important part of meetings
and company events
5. I rarely hear stories of past failures in my company

2

3

4

5

.13

-

.47**

.27**

-

.22**

.11

.33**

-

.11

.02

.18*

.15

-

*. p < .05, two-tailed. **. p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 5 shows correlations for the Risk Taking aspect of organizational tolerance
for failure. Most items showed high and significant correlations between themselves.
Only one positive and weak, but still statistically significant relationship was found
between the items “My company provides resources to develop pilot studies or
prototypes of new products or services” and “I think my company prefers to avoid taking
risks.” (r = .17, p < .05)
Table 5
Employees’ Perceptions on Organizational Tolerance for Failure Scale: Pearson
Correlation
Risk Taking (n =139)
1. I feel my organization wants me to avoid taking even calculated risks
2. My company provides resources to develop pilot studies or prototypes of new
products or services
3. I believe my company is willing to take some risks to create new innovative
services or products
4. I think my company prefers to avoid taking risks
5. My company understands that risk taking is a necessary requirement for
exploration

1
-

2

3

4

.23**

-

.44**

.36**

-

.40**

.17*

.45**

-

.55**

.32**

.56**

.46**

5

*. p < .05, two-tailed. **. p < .01, two-tailed.

The analysis for intercorrelations among items for the Psychological Safety
subscale is shown in Table 6. They revealed that most items showed positive, high, and
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significant relationships among themselves. They ranged from r = .43 to r = .64. Only
one item, “My company believes in “fail early, fail fast, fail cheap” displayed no
relationship with any other items. This might indicate that this item measures a different
dimension.
Table 6
Pearson Correlation: Psychological Safety (n=136)
1. My company accepts that failure is a necessary part of success
2. My company accepts failure as an inevitable byproduct of taking
initiatives
3. Mistakes are seen by my company as opportunities to learn
4. When failures take place in my company, they are not criticized,
but analyzed to avoid them in the future
5. My company believes in “fail early, fail fast, fail cheap”
6. I am encouraged at work to keep trying, even when something I try
goes wrong

1
-

2

3

4

5

.63**

-

.64**

.58**

-

.43**

.51**

.56**

-

.13

.14

.03

.08

-

.45**

.55**

.55**

.47**

-.14

6

-

*. p < .05, two-tailed. **. p < .01, two-tailed.

Correlations for Supervisor Support (Table 7) showed small to moderately strong
correlations ranging from r = .18 to r = .56. The item with the lowest, nonetheless
significant correlation was “Senior management doesn’t understand that when you try
something new, you sometimes fail.” (r = .18) With this exception, this item was
moderately related to any other item in the subscale.
Table 7
Pearson Correlation: Supervisor Support (n=140)
1
1. Senior management doesn’t understand that when you try something
new, you sometimes fail
2. My manager supports me when I try different ways of doing things
3. I feel that my manager encourages me to take small and thoughtful
risks
4. My manager has an analytical approach when mistakes occur that
helps me understand why they happened
5. I feel criticized and evaluated if I explore new ideas and they do not
work
6. My manager has shared with me some of his/her own work mistakes
*. p < .05, two-tailed. **. p < .01, two-tailed.

31

2

3

4

5

6

.25**

-

.35**

.53**

-

.18*

.54**

.42**

-

.33**

.43**

.44**

.33**

-

.22**

.52**

.56**

.52**

.39**

-

For the items grouped under “Others,” shown in Table 8, the six items displayed
small to moderate correlations among themselves. While all other five items correlated
with at least four other items, the item, “At work, I am allotted time to work on projects
of my own interest” was correlated to only two items, “The company I work for values
the need for exploration” (r = .29, p < .05) and “My company allots special budgets to
explore new projects/products” (r = .19, p < .01).
Table 8
Pearson Correlation: Others (n=140)
1. At work, I am allotted time to work on projects of my own interest
2. The company I work for publicly expresses a tolerance for failure
3. The company I work for values the need for exploration
4. When a project is not going as expected, there is a clear plan on how to
end it before more resources are wasted
5. When a project is cancelled at work, it is analyzed to understand what
went wrong in order to avoid making similar mistakes in the future
6. My company allots special budgets to explore new projects/products

1
-

2

3

4

5

.06

-

.29**

.28**

-

.04

.34**

.32**

-

.12

.48**

.28**

.43**

-

.19*

.30**

.11

.18*

.19*

6

-

*. p < .05, two-tailed. **. p < .01, two-tailed.

Factor Analysis
A principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted to explore the underlying
dimensions for the “Employees’ Perceptions on Organizational Tolerance for Failure”
scale. This type of analysis was selected because the author did not have any adequate
reasons to discard any of the data gathered for the study. In addition, a Varimax rotation
was used under the assumption that different components would be unrelated to each
other. This analysis yielded nine components with eigenvalues greater than 1.4. These
nine components accounted for almost 65% (64.95%) of the total variance. However,
upon reviewing the dimensions in greater detail, the author found that five out of the nine
components consisted of only one or two items. Hence, when deciding how many
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dimensions to extract to reach the best solution, the following criteria were decided: (a)
the component must be interpretable, meaningful, and predicted theoretically (Sprecher &
Metts, 1989); (b) an item had to load high (>.40) on at least one dimension; (c)
eigenvalues of 1.4 and higher only; and (d) communalities for each item must to be
greater than .25.
Using these criteria, several factor analyses were run. As a result, four items were
eliminated from the final scale. “At work, I’m allotted time to work on projects of my
own interest,” “I believe stories about successes and failures are an important part of
meetings and company events”, “I rarely hear stories of past failures in my company”,
and “My company believes in ‘fail early, fail fast, fail cheap.’”
After these modifications, a four-factor PCA with Varimax rotation, which
included 31 items and explained 51.84% of the variance was accepted. Factor 1
accounted for 33,31% of the variance; Factor 2 for 7.86%; Factor 3 for 5.53%; and Factor
4 for 5.18% (Table 9). Following the criterion of factor loading equal to or higher than
.40, Factor 1 consisted of items like “I believe my company punishes people that fail,”
“My company considers failure to be unacceptable,” “I feel my organization wants me to
avoid taking even calculated risks,” “I believe my company is willing to take some risks
to create new innovative services or products,” and “I think my company prefers to avoid
taking risks,” among others.
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Table 9
Principal Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation
Item
My company considers failure to be unacceptable
I believe my company punishes people that fail (R)
My company accepts failure as an inevitable byproduct of taking initiatives
Mistakes are seen by my company as opportunities to learn
I feel my organization wants me to avoid taking even calculated risks (R)
My company understands that risk taking is a necessary requirement for
exploration
I am encouraged at work to keep trying, even when something I try goes
wrong
I believe my company is willing to take some risks to create new innovative
services or products
My company accepts that failure is a necessary part of success
Senior management doesn’t understand that when you try something new,
you sometimes fail (R)
I feel criticized and evaluated if I explore new ideas and they do not work
(R)
I think my company prefers to avoid taking risks
My manager has shared with me some of his/her own work mistakes
My manager supports me when I try different ways of doing things
When a project is not going as expected, there is a clear plan on how to end
it before more resources are wasted
I feel that my manager encourages me to take small and thoughtful risks
My manager has an analytical approach when mistakes occur that helps me
understand why they happened
When a project is cancelled at work, it is analyzed to understand what went
wrong in order to avoid making similar mistakes in the future
I feel that the rewards programs offered by my company encourage people
to explore their ideas regardless of eventual outcomes
When failures take place in my company, they are not criticized, but
analyzed to avoid them in the future
The company I work for values the need for exploration
Stories about past successes and failures in my organization encourage me to
try new things
At my company, stories of past failures are used to encourage employees to
try new things
My company provides resources to develop pilot studies or prototypes of
new products or services
I feel less motivated to get involved in exploration if I know the results will
affect my performance reward
I believe my company’s compensation practices reward pay-for-performance
for tasks that involve exploration
I think my company’s pay programs tolerate failure in early stages of the
exploration activity and reward long-term success
The company I work for publicly expresses a tolerance for failure
My company allots special budgets to explore new projects/products
My company organizes events that celebrate projects that did not succeed
I know people in my organization who were promoted even though they
were involved in projects that failed
Variance
Cumulative Variance

OBV
.81
.71
.68
.65
.63

Factor Loadings
OSSM
CRS
.03
-.01
-.00
.67
.30
.28
.41
.21
.26
.10

REC
.02
.39
.17
.19
-.20

.62

.40

.27

-.01

.61

.23

-.00

.00

.55

.43

.10

.04

.59
.53

.29
.08

.24
-.18

.30
.22

.53

.33

.06

.03

.40
.25
.46

.29
.72
.63

.17
.02
-.22

.04
.02
-.03

-.05

.61

.30

.22

.38

.59

-.04

-.03

.23

.59

.11

.08

.07

.58

.50

.17

.21

.55

.25

.26

.42

.53

.22

.17

.49

.51

.01

-.08

.29

.50

.32

.30

.11

.50

.50

.10

.20

.43

-.14

.29

.09

.40

-.34

.13

-.01

.01

.77

.06

.23

.04

.66

-.08

.20
.17
-0.13

.22
.19
.11

.50
-.11
.17

.44
.70
.68

.42

-.04

.00

.45

33.26%
33.26%

7.87%
41.13%

5.53%
46.66%

5.18%
51.84%

Note. (R)= item is reverse scored. (OBV)= Organizational Beliefs and Values. (OSSM)= Organizational and Supervisor Support and
Motivation. (CRS)= Compensation and Reward Systems. (REC)= Recognition. Factor loadings ≥.40 are shown in boldface.
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There were four items from the author’s Risk Taking subscale, another four items
from Psychological Safety, two items from supervisor support, and two additional items,
each from the remaining aspects. The common characteristic among these items was the
organizational beliefs on the central importance of risk taking and failure. Hence, this
dimension was named “Organizational Values and Beliefs.”
The second dimension was called “Organizational and Supervisor Support and
Motivation.” It consisted of 13 items such as “I feel that the rewards programs offered by
my company encourage people to explore their ideas regardless of eventual outcomes,” “I
feel less motivated to get involved in exploration if I know the results will affect my
performance reward,” “At my company, stories of past failures are used to encourage
employees to try new things,” and “When failures take place in my company, they are not
criticized, but analyzed to avoid them in the future.” Four of the items included in this
factor were originally from the Supervisor Support scale, two from the Compensation and
Rewards Systems scale, two from Organizational Stories, another three from “Others,”
one from Psychological Safety, and the last item was original to Risk Taking subscale.
Even though the variety of items comprising this factor, all shared a common
denominator: the support provided by organizations, and by direct supervisors in risk
taking and failure situations. The item “At my company, stories about past failures are
used to encourage employees to try new things” was then included in this factor, even
though it has a high cross loading with Factor 3 (.50).
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Table 10
Extraction and Rotation of the Factors
Eigenvalues
Factor
Organizational Beliefs and
Values
Organizational and Supervisor
Support and Motivation
Compensation and Reward
Systems
Recognition

Rotations Sums of Squared
Loadings
Variance Cumulative
Total
(%)
(%)

Total

Variance
(%)

Cumulative
(%)

10.31

33.26

33.26

5.99

19.32

19.32

2.43

7.86

41.13

5.22

16.84

36.17

1.71

5.53

46.66

2.67

8.63

44.80

1.6

5.18

51.84

2.18

7.03

51.84

Unlike previous factors, the “Compensation and Reward Systems” component
was comprised by three items only: “I believe my company’s compensation practices
reward pay-for-performance for tasks that involve exploration,” “I think my company’s
pay programs tolerate failure in early stages of the exploration activity and reward longterm success,” and “The company I work for values the need for exploration.” This last
item was original to the “Others” subscale. The first two items were originally part of the
Compensation and Rewards Systems subscale.
And lastly, the last component was named “Recognition”. “My company
organizes events that celebrate projects that did not succeed,” “I know people in my
organization who were promoted even though they were involved in projects that failed,”
and “My company allots special budgets to explore new projects/products” comprised
this dimension. While two of the items were included initially with the Compensation
and Rewards Systems, the other item was part of the “Others” subscale. The item “I
know people in my organization who were promoted even though they were involved in
projects that failed” was included in this dimension since it had a greater loading with
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Factor 4 (.45) than Factor 1 (.42). Together all items highlighted the importance of
recognition of different aspects needed for innovation.
To summarize, in search for the best model that would identify the underlying
dimensions of Employees’ Perceptions on Organizational Tolerance for Failure, a fourfactor PCA with Varimax rotation model was accepted. It explained almost 52% of the
variance of the 31 items comprising the scale. The new dimensions were:
“Organizational Values and Beliefs,” “Organizational and Supervisor Support and
Motivation,” “Compensation and Rewards Systems,” and “Recognition.”
Estimation of Reliability
Internal consistency reliability was estimated for all items included in the original
scale. Cronbach alpha (α) was used as the measure of the internal consistency for the
general scale and subscales. While the internal reliability test conducted for the original
overall 35 items included in the Employees’ Perceptions on Organizational Tolerance for
Failure scale showed a high reliability (α = .92), some of the internal subscales failed to
displayed acceptable results. Those ranged from as low as α = .38 for Compensation and
Rewards Systems to α = .80 for Supervisor Support. Therefore, the author assumed the
problem might be rooted in the way items were gathered. Once modifications were done
and the final scale was established, the author run an additional analysis to measure the
reliabilities of the overall scale and subscales. Table 11 shows the reliability for the
overall scale (i.e. 31 items), which resulted in α = .92, indicating the scale was highly
reliable to measure the intended concept of Employees’ Perceptions on Organizational
Tolerance for Failure (Table 12). The 12 items composing the “Organizational Values
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and Beliefs” subscale showed a high internal consistency (α = .90). Regarding the
“Organizational and Supervisor Support and Motivation” internal consistency was also
high (α = .87) for the 13 items comprising the scale. The estimate of reliability for the
Compensation and Rewards Systems displayed a modest internal consistency, α = .60.
That being said, this subscale contained only three items. Finally, the Recognition
subscale internal consistency showed the lowest reliability of all (α = .49). Eliminating
some of the items did not appear to be a reasonable solution to increase the scale’s
reliability. One possible explanation of the lower reliability might relay on the number
(three) of items comprising the scale. Furthermore, the final factor analysis showed that
only two items clearly high-loaded with the dimension, whereas the additional item had a
high cross loading with other dimension.
Table 11
Employees’ Perceptions on Organizational Tolerance for Failure Scale: Reliability
Cronbach α
.90
.87
.60
.49
.92

Organizational Values and Beliefs
Organizational and Supervisor Support and Motivation
Compensation and Rewards Systems
Recognition
Overall Scale

To conclude, analyses have shown that the overall internal consistency of the
Employees’ Perceptions on Organizational Tolerance for Failure Scale was highly
reliable (α = .92). Also, two of the dimensions, Organizational Values and Beliefs and
Organizational and Supervisor Support and Motivation, identified throughout this
research have displayed high internal reliabilities (α = .90 and α = .87, respectively). The
other two dimensions, Compensation and Rewards Systems and Recognition subscales,
revealed a lower consistency (α = .60 and α = .49, respectively).
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Discussion
The main purpose of this study was to develop a reliable assessment tool
measuring employee perceptions of organizational tolerance for intelligent failure. This
section will cover the author’s evaluation of the scale, strengths and limitations of the
study, suggestions for future research, and it will also provide scale’s practical
applications outside the academia domain.
Based on the analyses conducted for this research, the Employee Perceptions of
Organizational Tolerance for Failure Scale was an acceptable first attempt to develop a
tool measuring employee perceptions and beliefs regarding their employer’s tolerance for
failure. That being said, further modifications are needed to improve the reliability of
some of the subscales.
Evaluation of the Scale
The descriptive statistics used revealed a relatively normal distribution for all
items included in the scale. Pearson correlation on the Compensation and Reward
Systems and Organizational Stories subscales did not show a consistent relationship
among items. Risk Taking and Psychological Safety showed high and statistically
significant inter-item relationships. Only one item, “My company believes in ‘fail early,
fail fast, fail cheap’” failed to display relationship with any other items in the
Psychological Safety scale. Moderate to high relationships between items were found for
the Supervisor Support and Others subscales.
An estimate of the reliability of the 31 final items in the scale was highly
acceptable. Internal consistency for the Organizational Values and Beliefs and for the
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Organizational and Supervisor Support and Motivation subscales was highly acceptable
as well. However, the estimates of internal consistency for the Compensation and
Rewards Systems and Recognition subscales were not acceptable.
Factor analyses showed that the developed measurement scale assesses the
concept of Employees’ Perceptions of Organizational Tolerance for Failure to a great
extent. On the one hand, a principal component analysis with Varimax rotation showed
that there were nine underlying components for the original 36 scale items. On the other
hand, subsequent factor analysis, following determined criteria and modifications to find
the best solution, revealed that the scale was composed only by four components. These
components were named Compensation and Reward Systems, Organizational Values and
Beliefs, Organizational and Supervisor Support and Motivation, and Recognition.
The final scale dimensions somewhat resembled the original subscales. Most of
the original items were kept for the scale’s final version; however, they were displayed in
a different arrangement. Most of the new components were constituted by items found in
different original subscales. The component that showed the most consistency with the
original subscales was Organizational Values and Beliefs. From its 12 items, eight items
were original to Risk Taking and Psychological Safety, with four items from each of the
other dimensions. Differently, four out of the 13 items composing Organizational and
Supervisor Support and Motivation were original to the Supervisor Support subscale.
However, the rest came from other subscales. Compensation and Rewards Systems
included two original subscale items and an additional “Others” item. And lastly, the new
Recognition dimension combined two items from the original Compensation and
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Rewards Systems with one from Other items. Therefore, it can be concluded that the
items created by the author contributed to measure the concept of Employees’
Perceptions on Organizational Tolerance for Failure, as shown by their overall internal
reliability consistency.
That being said, the aspects found in previous empirical literature were not fully
supported. The present research found that these independent aspects proposed by the
existing literature as underlying factors of Organizational Tolerance for Failure were not
as independent as hypothesized. The current study shows that these aspects are
interrelated, and together form new underlying dimensions not considered in previous
research.
Based on the reliability analyses, most of the proposed 31 items composing the
Employees’ Perceptions on Organizational Tolerance for Failure should be kept. None of
the analyses showed that eliminating any of the final items increases the internal
consistency of the overall scale. However, internal reliability analysis for the
Compensation and Rewards Systems subscale revealed that eliminating the item, “The
company I work for publicly expresses a tolerance for failure” would improve
considerably the subscale reliability. Therefore, the author recommends removing this
item from the final scale. Another dimension, Recognition, also showed a not acceptable
internal reliability. The author believes that the main reason for these lower internal
consistencies is the few number of items (three) constituting each dimension. Another
suggestion would be to reorganize all items according to the best solution proposed in
this study, a scale with the following four underlying components: Compensation and
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Reward Systems, Organizational Values and Beliefs, Organizational and Supervisor
Support and Motivation, and Recognition.
Practical Applications of the Scale
Organizations can make use of this scale as an assessment, developmental and
change management tool in an organizational level. For organizations that already value
the importance of exploration, this tool can serve as an assessment and developmental
aid. That is, the instrument might help them identify areas for improvement that the
organization may be dismissing. Also, this scale can contribute to confirm whether the
intended message of tolerance for failure the organization is trying to portray is being
actually received by its employees.
For those organizations looking for innovation, the implementation of this scale
can help them first assess what employees believe is their organization’s tolerance for
failure capacity. This primary assessment will also provide organizations a frame of what
areas need to be changed in order to develop new organizational competences to become
more innovative.
No matter the organization’s innovation capacity, when making practical use of
this instrument, several behaviors are expected to take place in organizations.
Organizational performance should improve over time as a result of new or improved
exploration activities happening in the organization’s realm. It is also logical to assume
that once organizations engage in exploration, this will increase their patent portfolio.
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Strengths and Limitations of the Scale
The author believes that this research represents an acceptable first attempt to
operationalize the concept of Organizational Tolerance for Failure. A main strength of
the developed scale is the fact that it measures employees’ perceptions of the concept.
These perceptions as generally literature shows are the ones responsible for the
employees’ behaviors. However, this first attempt of the concept’s operationalization is
not without its flaws. First, the data collected for this study were gathered from people
all over the world. Although this may be considered a strength, the author believes that
because of the sample size, there might not be enough data to make significant
comparisons between different geographical locations.
Second, the present study did not differentiate between different types of
organizations or industries. One main piece of feedback received by one participant
asked to highlight the important distinction between non-profit to profit organizations.
Both kinds of organizations have very distinct objectives, and therefore the scale might
not be relevant to employees working, for example, in non-profit educational
organizations. Under the assumption that organizational innovation is related to the
development of new services and products with the ultimate goal of creating profit for
organizations, non-profit organizations might be less driven by organizational innovation
than for-profit organizations. Therefore, it is less likely to expect for non-profit
organizations to invest resources in exploration than in for-profit organizations.
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Future Research
Although the present study demonstrated that the Employees’ Perceptions on
Organizational Tolerance for Failure Scale is highly reliable, its validity needs yet to be
determined. In addition, development of new items will be needed for the Compensation
and Reward Systems subscale. Furthermore, a revision of the Recognition subscale is
needed in order to improve its reliability. Also, future research might want to focus on
applying the measurement scale to different types of organizations to establish its
usability or to establish modifications to make it relevant, if finding organizational
differences.
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